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 ABSTRACT 
 
INCORPORATING PRIVACY AND SECURITY FEATURES IN AN 
OPEN SOURCE SEARCH ENGINE 
 
The aim of this project was to explore and implement various privacy and security 
features in an open-source search engine and enhance the security and privacy capabilities 
of Yioop. Yioop, an open-source PHP search engine based on GPLv3 license, is designed 
and developed by Dr. Chris Pollett. We have enabled a crawl, search and index 
mechanism for hidden services by execution of codes, which has facilitated access of the 
Tor network in Yioop. We have diversified the ability of the previously supported text 
CAPTCHA functionality in Yioop by implementing hash CAPTCHA and provided 
feasibility to toggle between text CAPTCHA and hash CAPTCHA. To enable the user to 
log in to his or her respective Yioop account without sharing the password over the 
network, we have incorporated zero knowledge authentications in which Yioop does not 
store the user’s real password, but it stores the numerical password, which is derived from 
the user’s original password.  
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 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Most modern search engines record a user’s IP address, the time of visit and the 
user’s tracking cookies to keep track of searched terms in order to improve efficiency of 
the search results and to show user specific advertisements. This information can be used 
to reveal personal information and hence, many people object to its collection. 
The goal of this project was to learn about various security protocols and 
implement security and privacy features in an open-source search engine. We have 
explained Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) and steps to implement it. A PFS checker script 
written by us can be used to test whether a website supports PFS or not. We have gained 
knowledge of the Tor network and Tor hidden service, and also covered proxy settings in 
the Tor network to enable crawl of the Tor hidden service. We have designed hash 
CAPTCHA, which can be used as a substitute for text CAPTCHA. We incorporated a zero 
knowledge authentication system, which allows a system to authenticate users without any 
need for sharing an actual password over the network. 
The report is sorted into chapters. Chapter 2 briefly describes Yioop and its 
features. Chapter 3 explains Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) and detailed steps to 
implement and verify PFS. Chapter 4 presents an overview of the Tor network and Tor 
hidden service. Chapter 5 illustrates existing CAPTCHA system and implementation of 
the hash CAPTCHA. Chapter 6 briefs about zero knowledge authentication system. 
Chapter 7 gives the conclusion based on the results obtains in the previous chapters 
followed by the references.  
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 CHAPTER 2 
SUMMARY OF BACKGROUND 
WORK IN YIOOP 
 
 
Yioop, an open source PHP Search engine created by Dr. Chris Pollett.  It allows 
user to index a website or a collection of websites. In Yioop, the user has control over the 
exact sites which are being indexed with Yioop. Yioop supports the indexing of many 
different file types including: HTML, Atom, BMP, DOC, ePub, GIF, JPG, PDF, PPT, 
PPTX, PNG, RSS, RTF, Sitemaps, SVG, XLSX, and XML. It has a web interface for 
controlling which, amongst these file types (or all of them) user want to index. It supports 
also attempting to extract information from unknown file types. . It can index page ranges 
up to tens or hundreds of millions. It is designed to work on PC, Smartphone and tablet.  
Yioop supports  crawling, indexing and searching on either single machine and or 
several machines. Yioop crawler can crawl websites and non-web archives. It has two 
important processes: fetcher and queue server. A fetcher downloads the contents from 
crawled web pages or non-web archives and processes them. The queue server performs 
of index building and scheduling activities. It is written using its own model-view-
controller framework with a user interface that is simple and user-friendly For further 
details on Yioop’s features user can refer to SeekQuarry website [1].  
Dr. Pollett has started developing Yioop in 2010. He is the primary author of 
Yioop. In the past,  few students had incorporated various features in Yioop. Students had 
implemented new features such as autosuggest and spell check, text summarization, 
source-code searching capability and geographical location local search, access control in 
a social networking environment and wordnet feature.  
11 
 
  Prior to this project, Yioop could not crawl the Tor network; hence it was not 
possible to index the Tor hidden services. We modified Fetch URL function of Yioop to 
provide capability of accessing the Tor network. New code was added in the controllers, 
models and views to support the hash CAPTCHA and zero knowledge authentication. To 
calculate SHA1 and Fiat-Shamir parameters new JavaScripts have been implemented. 
“SHA1_test” case is also written to verify the output of SHA1 JavaScript.  
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 CHAPTER 3 
PERFECT FORWARD 
SECRECY 
 
Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS)  is a property of a key-agreement protocol which 
guarantees that a session key used to encrypt the data will never be compromised even 
though a private key is compromised in the future [2]. 
3.1 Overview of PFS 
Let’s assume a user accesses a website which uses HTTPS protocol for secure 
communication. In the beginning of this process, the client requests the secure connection 
to which the server sends back the certificate detail which contains its public key. The 
server also has a private key which can be used to decrypt the data encrypted using its 
public key. The client browser generates a session key and encrypts the data using it. It 
then encrypts the session key using the public key provided by the server. Along with this 
data, the client also shares the encrypted session key with the server. The server uses its 
private key to decrypt the encrypted session key and this key is used to decrypt all the 
communication messages. In this setup, the session key is known only to the client and the 
private key is known only to the server. Figure 1 shows the steps involved in SSL 
handshaking. An attacker can sniff over the network and capture this encrypted data. The 
attacker needs either the session key which is generated by the client or a private key of the 
server to decrypt this data. As he is not aware of either of these keys, he will not be able to 
decrypt the data. However, he can still store all the intercepted messages and later on if he 
obtains the private key by some technique like breaking into the server computers, he can 
derive the session key and decrypt all the stored messages. Not all decrypted information is 
important, but some information like credit card and address details are important even 
after a few years. This spot is the motivation factor for the PFS. 
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Figure 1: SSL handshaking 
In PFS, instead of using the single session key to encrypt all the communication 
messages, a client (browser) periodically creates a new session key. Both client and server 
contribute to the key generation and use a random value for each key. The client and server 
forget this random value after the key creation. Even if an attacker managed to obtain a 
private key, he would not know the random value generated by the client and the server so 
could not reconstruct the session key [3].  
Derivation of the session key is the key factor to determine whether a connection 
has PFS or not. While creating a secure connection, the Transport Layer Security (TLS) 
handshake protocol is responsible for the authentication and key exchange. The TLS 
protocol essentially performs three key things: cipher suite negotiation, authentication of a 
server and key exchange [4]. The cipher suite is responsible for the derivation of the 
session key. 
In the beginning of the SSL handshake, the client browser sends a list of supported 
cipher suites to the server. The server then picks one of the cipher suites, based on the 
14 
 ranking defined in the SSL configuration file of the server, and then informs the client 
about the usage of the cipher suite in future communication. Cipher suites, which use 
ephemeral Diffie-Hellman (DHE) or the elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE) for the 
key generation, give PFS. 
A webserver needs to be configured to enable PFS. Usually the SSL configuration 
file on the web server has information about a list of cipher suites which are supported by 
the server. While determining the cipher suite for the connection, the web server starts 
scanning the list of cipher suites in order and returns the first match which is sent by the 
client. Thus the order of cipher suites is also important. In order to enable PFS, DHE and 
ECDHE, cipher suites should be given higher order in the configuration file. 
For Apache server, PFS requires Apache version 2.3.3 or higher. Figure 2 shows 
the configuration setting in the “httpd-ssl.config” file to enable PFS on Apache server.  
 
Figure 2: Settings in httpd-ssl.config file to enable PFS 
There are certain challenges in enabling PFS, the first being that it uses Diffie-
Hellman key exchange. In this exchange a new session key is generated for each request. 
This key generation takes significant time, thus PFS can increase the server response 
time. The second challenge is from the client’s side, which is that not all browsers support 
necessary cipher suites.  Most browsers assign less priority to the cipher suites that 
support PFS. Figure 3 shows the browser support for PFS (Data is taken from the 
Netcraft's SSL survey conducted in September 2013). 
15 
 
  
*Opera does not include its TLS 1.2 cipher suites. 
Figure 3: Browser support for PFS [5] 
3.2 PFS verification and PFS Checker Script 
There are many ways to verify whether a website supports PFS or not. The SSL 
scan utility and SSL lab website are good sources to verify it. I have used the SSL scan 
utility to demonstrate that Yioop supports PFS. Figure 4 shows PFS verification of Yioop 
using the SSL scan utility. As shown in Figure, Yioop prefers a cipher suite 
DHE_RSA_AES256-SHA for the connection and hence it supports PFS. 
PFS checker is a PHP script written by us to verify whether a website supports PFS 
or not. The input to the script is a URL of the website. The script tries to make the 
connection with the website using different cipher suites and verifies whether the website 
supports PFS or not. In the results, all the ciphers marked with the blue color are the ones 
which support PFS and are supported by the website. The ciphers in red support PFS but 
are not supported by the website. The “PFS Support” field indicates whether websites 
16 
 
support PFS or not. The snapshot of the result of PFS verification of Yioop is shown in 
Figure 5. 
Figure 4: PFS verification of Yioop using SSL scan utility 
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Figure 5: PFS verification of Yioop using PFS checker script 
I have used the “SSL Lab Test” website to test which search engines support PFS 
and the result for the same is as shown in table 1. 
Table 1:  PFS test on various search engines [6]. 
Website Name Supports PFS or Not 
Yioop.com Yes 
Google.com Yes 
Yahoo.com Yes 
Bing.com No 
Duckduckgo.com Yes 
AOL.com No 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
 PFS provides long-term security to the data communicated over the network. It 
protects previous communications from retrospective decryption. On April 7, 2014 a 
serious security bug was found in the OpenSSL (which is widely used to implement 
Transport Layer Security Protocol). It is estimated that half a million sites were affected 
by this bug and the data of millions was compromised [7]. The impact of the Heartbleed 
bug could have been alleviated if most of the servers and clients had enabled the PFS.  
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 CHAPTER 4 
CRAWLING TOR 
NETWORK 
 
The Onion Router (Tor) is an open source software used by journalists, the 
military, corporates, and many others for anonymous internet surfing. Originally it was 
designed and developed to protect the U.S. navy’s confidential communication [8]. 
  Tor network prevents the “Traffic analysis” attack which is a special kind of 
attack to deduce the pattern information from the communication pattern.  In this attack, 
the attacker observes the flow of data packets between two entities in a system. This 
attack can be used to identify who is talking with whom on the internet. 
4.1 Overview of the Tor network 
Tor uses an Onion routing system. It maintains a list of the available machines 
(a.k.a nodes) and uses them to direct traffic over the Internet. Tor distributes the 
transaction among different nodes so there is no single point connection between the 
sender and receiver. Since the transaction is distributed among many nodes, it is difficult 
to do traffic analysis [9]. 
For example, User A uses Tor network to send data to user B. User A’s Tor client 
obtains a list of the available nodes from the Tor server and randomly selects three nodes 
(e.g. Node 1, node 2 and node 3). Then it applies multiple layer of encryption on the data 
using the public key of the selected nodes so each of the selected nodes can decrypt the 
incoming packet using their private keys. Instead of sending data packet directly from A 
to B, Tor network sends encrypted packet from A to Node 1. Tor client on Node 1 
decrypts the first layer of encryption and identifies the next node where it needs to send 
the packet. This process continues till Node 3, where it receives the location of the user B 
and finally transmits the unencrypted message. Each node in the Tor circuit has 
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knowledge of only two nodes: the node from which it receives the packet, and the node 
to which it sends the packet. Randomness in the node selection process is very important. 
For each request from A to B, Tor client selects different nodes so it would be very 
difficult for the network interceptor to associate data packets with any node.  
Figure 6: working of the Tor network [10] 
4.2 Yioop as a Tor hidden service 
Tor hidden service allows publishers to publish the service without revealing 
their identity (IP address). Users can connect to a hidden service without knowing 
publisher of the service using the rendezvous point. This type of anonymity provides 
protection against distributed DoS attacks as an attacker would not know the IP address 
of a service [11]. 
20 
 We have published Yioop running on localhost as a hidden service and the steps 
to create it are stated below: 
1. Install a web server locally 
2. Configure the hidden service to point to the local web server 
3. Open the torrc file located at: \Tor\Tor Browser\Data\Tor \torrc 
4. Now add an entry like below in the torrc file 
a. HiddenServiceDir D:\Tor\HiddenService 
b. HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80 
5. Save the torrc file and restart the Tor client 
HiddenServiceDir is a place where the Tor stores the information about a hidden 
service. Tor will generate a hostname file in this folder, which has an Onion URL for the 
service. Tor has generated the onion URL for this service, which is 
http://x2emztb4ndxvhzt6.onion/. We have accessed this hidden service using the Tor 
browser and the result page is as shown in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7: Example of Tor hidden service 
21 
 
  
4.3 Crawling Tor network 
Our goal was to implement the code in Yioop so it can crawl the Tor network. To 
achieve this, the first thing, we did was to gain knowledge of the Tor network and Tor 
hidden service. The next step was to install the Tor client. The Tor bundle is available for 
all major operating systems. We downloaded the Tor bundle for Windows 7 and 
configured the proxy settings in the Tor browser. Figure 8 shows various proxy setting 
options available in Tor. 
 
Figure 8: Proxy settings in Tor browser 
Once we understood the working of the Tor network, the next step was to 
implement the code in Yioop so it can crawl the Tor network. We have added code in the 
functions: “getPages”, “prepareUrlHeaders”, and “getPage” of the fetch_url.php. Tor 
network has an issue that it increases the access time of the website as it needs to bounce 
the internet packet among Tor nodes. We have written code in such a manner that during 
crawl, fetcher will use Tor network only when it is crawling an Onion URL. Figure 9 
shows proxy server settings in Yioop. Admin user can configure these settings to use the 
Tor network during the crawl. 
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 To verify whether Yioop can actually crawl the Onion URL, we did crawl on the 
onion URL and Yioop was able to crawl it successfully. Figure 10 shows the snapshot of 
the crawl. After the crawl, we had set up the crawl data as search index and performed 
the search query. Figure 11 shows the snapshot of the search query and result. 
 
Figure 9: Tor proxy settings in Yioop 
 
 
Figure 10:  Yioop crawling an Onion URL 
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Figure 11: Onion URL search query on Yioop 
 
4.4 Tor proxy link 
In the client-server communication, a proxy server acts as an intermediate 
machine which hides the internal clients from an external network. It is a substitute for 
connecting directly to the web. 
Ixquick is a popular search engine which provides proxy links for each query 
result, so the users can surf websites anonymously. We have decided to implement a 
similar kind of feature in Yioop so it can generate a proxy link for each query result. 
When user clicks on the proxy link, request first comes to the Yioop server, which in turn 
forwards the request to the website and returns the result page to the user.  In this case, 
Yioop server acts as a forward proxy server, which gets the HTTP request from a client 
and forwards it to the requested website, thus provides anonymity to the client IP. In 
addition to that, Yioop server uses Tor connection to make a request to website, so 
Yioop’s identity can be kept hidden. 
We have implemented code in “search_view.php” file to create a dynamic proxy 
link. Also, we have added class “ProxyURL” to receive a URL from the user and to 
make a request to the website through the Tor network. The snapshot of the proxy link 
feature is as shown in Figure 12. 
24 
 
  
Figure 12: Proxy link feature in Yioop 
4.5 Conclusion 
Tor network and Tor hidden service have gained popularity in recent times. Duck 
Duck Go is a popular search engine, which is published as the Tor hidden service [12] 
and its onion URL is https://3g2upl4pq6kufc4m.onion/.  The ability to crawl the Tor 
network will allow Yioop to index the Tor hidden services and display them in the search 
result. The proxy link feature will provide anonymous web surfing experience to the 
user. 
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  CHAPTER 5 
   HASH CAPTCHA 
CAPTCHA stands for Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell 
Computers and Humans Apart. It is a type of a challenge response test to find whether a 
user is human or machine [13]. CAPTCHA prevents spam submission by automated 
software thus improving the quality of the software, and is mainly used in registration 
functionality, forgot password functionality, and in the comment field for a blog post. 
5.1 Existing CAPTCHA system 
In today’s world, there are different types of CAPTCHAs available.  The first and 
a very popular type of CAPTCHA is a standard distorted word with an audio option. This 
CAPTHCA uses twisted letters and a background color gradient to hide the message. 
From a security point of view, this CAPTCHA is reliable as the distorted word is hard to 
crack by machine. However, sometimes legitimate users also face difficulty in 
deciphering it. The picture identification CAPTCHA is also very popular. In this 
CAPTCHA, a few images and a question are shown to a user where he needs to identify 
the correct image based on the question. This CAPTCHA is very user-friendly. The 
math-solving CAPTCHA and 3D CAPTCHA are also popular [14]. 
CAPTCHA implementation is very important factor from a security point of 
view. In earlier CAPTCHA implementation, the hidden fields were used to store the 
questions and answers of CAPTCHA on the client side where it was verified using 
JavaScript. A smart machine can easily read the values of these hidden fields, thus can 
solve the CAPTCHA. Therefore, any implementation which stores CAPTCHA’s data on 
the client side is highly vulnerable. 
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Figure 13: Different types of CAPTCHAs [14] 
Recently a few attacks exploited the server-side weakness of CAPTCHA 
implementation. Randomness in CAPTCHA generation is very important. Theoretically 
server should not utilize the fixed set of CAPTCHA; it should generate a random 
CAPTCHA for each new request. Many of the sites use predefined sets of CAPTCHA. 
Each CAPTCHA is associated with an identifier which can either be a numeric or a 
fixed-length character string. The rainbow attack can exploit websites which use a static 
identifier. In this type of attack, the attacker creates the lookup table of CAPTCHA 
identifiers and its solution. The attacker solves all the CAPTCHAs manually and at 
runtime uses this table to find the CAPTCHA’s answer [15]. Table 2 shows an example 
of rainbow table.  
27 
 Table 2: Example of rainbow table [15] 
Identifier CAPTCHA Solution 
0 95C7A 95C7A 
1 58412 58412 
2 9038F 9038F 
3 49F1C 49F1C 
4 A8887 A8887 
5 K89D K89D 
998 IOP9 IOP9 
999 KLO7 KLO7 
 
Figure 14 illustrates users' responses on CAPTCHA. Most of the users bother by 
the CAPTCHA. Another issue with difficult CAPTCHA is that it not only prevents 
spam, but also prevents search engine bots. The search engine bot will not be able to 
parse the web page, thus the page will not appear in the search results. This way it can 
reduce the popularity of the website. 
 
Figure 14: User's response on CAPTCHA 
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  We were looking for some technique that is user-friendly and at the same time 
does not compromise security. Bitcoin’s hashcash implementation has motivated us to 
implement hash CAPTCHA. 
5.2 Cryptographic HASH function: 
Hash CAPTCHA uses the concept of a cryptographic hash function. A hash 
function takes an arbitrary length string as input and returns a fixed-size string as output. 
Any minor change in the input should result in a completely different output string. 
Figure 15 shows example of cryptographic hash function. The ideal cryptographic hash 
function has four main properties: First, for any given string it should be easy to calculate 
the hash. The input string may contain alphabets, digits or special characters. Second, it 
is infeasible to generate a message that has a given hash. Third, even a slight change in 
the input string should result in a completely different hash. Fourth, two different input 
strings should not produce the same hash value [17].  
 
Figure 15: Example of cryptographic hash function [18] 
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 SHA-1 and SHA-256 are very popular hash functions. They were designed by 
United States National Security Agency. SHA-1 generates 160-bit (20-byte) hash value 
and SHA-256 generates 256-bit (32-byte) hash value [19]. 
Table 3: Example of a cryptographic SHA1 function 
Input String Output (Hexadecimal Value) 
Abcde 03de6c570bfe24bfc328ccd7ca46b76eadaf4334 
Abcdx a96e144dfdc6380c8a4ae43bea1c81cb01215020 
Abcdo debc9595cdf63a07efb18141692dcaab67f115fc 
ABCDO 58ba5a974fa794df712866f355c9c63ac162d4d2 
1x%&b!!B 52f4190f30e51d55bb03220f9bf47fae538dc1f8 
 
Table 4: Example of a cryptographic SHA256 function 
I/P Output: Hexadecimal Value 
abcde 36bbe50ed96841d10443bcb670d6554f0a34b761be67ec9c4a8ad2c0c44ca42c 
abcdx f2d58ae536dc5d52ff1c83332ea1184be67febd39eaab1c98118a6cb33b9aa2a 
abcdo ffb2fa8d1f9c02b9b3dfb3a465399a294533f7f131e6d3d773b2be786918b377 
ABCDO d8d219fd83565b7d122b0c7ac7629478649a429118d94dbd0c983ac054e7a262 
1x%&b!!B 6b1d09646c61379166432352cfdec05c839dc2cb37df910742171b3edeb68799 
 
So we had two choices, either use SHA1 or SHA256 to generate a hash value for 
the input string. We have written a JavaScript to compare the execution time of SHA1 
and SHA256 functions and CryptoJS library to calculate the SHA1 and SHA256 values. 
Figure 16 shows an execution time comparison of the SHA1 and SHA256 function. We 
did 50 iterations for each input so the execution time can be compared in milliseconds. 
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 After the experiment, we have realized that SHA1 and SHA256 calculations take 
almost same amount of time in hash generation, so I have decided to use SHA1 as it is 
very popular. 
5.3 Hash CAPTCHA 
Hash CAPTCHA is based on the hash cash proof of work concept. A proof of 
work is a piece of data which is difficult to produce as it must satisfy certain 
requirements. A client needs to perform some operations on the data at client side. This 
operation costs certain CPU cycles to the client. On the server side, it should be very 
easy to check whether the data sent by the client satisfies certain requirements or not. 
This setup prevents spam submission and denial attack by the client as for each 
submission, the client needs to carry out certain calculations which will cost some CPU 
cycles. 
Table 5:  Execution time comparison of the SHA1 and SHA256 function 
# Random String SHA1 Time 
(ms) 
SHA256 Time 
(ms) 
1 041006c58b8168eb4096e3f34d0a16e4 11 8 
2 1503130d07c2933db297e5fec1cb016b 7 3 
3 1cea132c84b7311467e9d47f187af16c 2 7 
4 c74b803684c192bb487137c2739cc0c7 3 3 
5 e62e08814a6242ee7081c52c6f18a500 2 1 
6 6f3174ec55e7499c676dfbd21dff31a1 3 3 
7 295e64d28a763357da183c00421f0ec8 1 3 
8 6e482115606c2377abbcc4545be62556 2 4 
9 99621044dd037e730b9f96c344949413 1 2 
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 # Random String SHA1 Time 
(ms) 
SHA256 Time 
(ms) 
10 d01a5d7696818fa79e0a7101c0b76c48 3 2 
11 dcc73ab38e6ef10083de0617edd9c425 3 2 
12 2b4babddd3511e2d4fcf5158d9805a14 1 5 
13 a81664ba0b59b14cadad4f9bffebf77a 4 2 
14 40eb5e28864484711466dfc0604f3037 3 2 
15 a5ce82caf8066931746e49c4ec28b313 4 1 
 
In our implementation, the server sends a random string to the client. JavaScript 
attached to the requested page calculates SHA1 on this random string. The script takes 
the random string sent by the server as an input and concatenates the integer value 
known as nonce at the end of the input string. The script then calculates SHA1 on the 
resultant string. If the resultant hash begins with ‘00’ then script returns nonce value; 
otherwise, nonce is incremented by 1 and the entire process starting from string 
concatenation is repeated. For example, we have taken “Test” as the random string and 
started nonce from 0. For the string “Test: 135,” SHA1 produces a hash that starts with 
the two leading zeroes. The script stores the nonce value in the hidden text field and it is 
sent to the server when the client submits the request. 
Table 6:  Example of hash CAPTCHA proof of work 
Input String SHA1 hash 
Test:0 0b96f625c18f94dcebf01ab6bf84413743952f10  
Test:1 6e8125d1846308969fb7cd4694b096333f310c4b  
Test:2 b2da2df3450dab8c0797d9e7da357d1bde454c07  
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 Input String SHA1 hash 
Test:3 0deb0e1be1b9889bddd4778f71eaa1c8c84845dd  
Test:133 7985064947063366a79195bc11a423a491ff542f  
Test:134 8575c8682f9fbb79034370fcfd0b17d5253a9ee2  
Test:135 0022bd9826082dd8af48c412dde45beba7a1c3d3 
 
On the server side, it is very easy to check whether the concatenation of the input 
string and nonce produces the desired number of leading zeroes or not. In modern 
computers, 135 calculation of SHA1 function does not take much time. To generate a 
hash of two leading zeroes, it generally takes fractions of a second. So this calculation 
would not affect the genuine client, but for the spammers it would be a highly CPU-
intensive task. 
One advantage of this system is that it is very simple to increase the client side 
calculation by simply varying the desired number of leading zeroes of the generated hash 
value. By simply changing this integer variable from 2 to 34, the client side calculation 
time will increase from approximately 1 second to 4 hours. 
5.4 Hash CAPTCHA in Yioop 
Yioop is using text CAPTCHA for “create an account” and “suggest URL” 
functionality. In the admin panel, we have added an option to toggle between text 
CAPTCHA and hash CAPTCHA. Figure 16 shows CAPTHCA mode option in Yioop. 
When a user requests for CAPTCHA enabled page, the server first determines the 
CAPTCHA mode and in the case of hash CAPTCHA, the server generates a random 
string and returns the requested page to the client. Once the page is loaded on the client 
browser, hash CAPTCHA script is called, which performs hash cash proof of works on 
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 the string sent by the server. It finds the nonce value for which the hash of the given 
string produces the desired number of leading zeroes. 
 
Figure 16: CAPTCHA mode option in Yioop 
When a client submits the form, the server checks that for the given nonce 
passed, and the random string produces the desired number of leading zeroes or not. If 
the validation passes, then the server proceeds with the requested action; otherwise, it 
gives a “hash code validation failed” error and sends the page back to the client with a 
new random string. On the server side, I have used PHP’s SHA1 function for 
verification. 
Ideally, the server should generate a random string for each new request. If the 
server uses a predefined set of random strings or very common algorithm to generate a 
random string, then an attacker may do some pre-calculations on the input strings and 
can tweak the JavaScript to avoid client-side calculation. To generate a random string, 
we have concatenated two parameters: the time of request and the auth_key of Yioop and 
performed md5 hash on the resultant script. Figure 17 shows a snapshot of “Suggest 
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 URL” module and Figure 18 shows a snapshot of “Create Account” module after hash 
CAPTCHA implementation. 
 
Figure 17: Hash CAPTCHA in “Create Account” module 
 
Figure 18: Hash CAPTCHA in “Create Account” module 
In hash CAPTCHA, JavaScript on the client side calculates SHA1 hash on the 
input string and it is important to verify whether JavaScript calculates correct SHA1 or 
not, otherwise it will never pass the CAPTCHA check at the server side. On the server 
we have used PHP’s SHA1 function for verification.  
We have decided to write the test cases for SHA1. One challenging task was to 
test the JavaScript function on the server side. PHP is a server-side scripting language, 
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 whereas JavaScript is a client-side scripting language. I have found one external PHP 
library called V8Js class. This library allows testing the JavaScript function at the server 
side. 
 The primary goal of Yioop’s design is that it should run on default PHP 
configuration and it should not have any dependency on the external library. Therefore, 
we have decided not to use any external library and write our own class to test the SHA1 
function. I have written a class called JavaScriptTest which extends the existing UnitTest 
class. It has a blank implementation of all the required functions of the Unit test 
framework. I have added a class called SHA1Test, which extends a class JavaScriptTest 
and compares the result of a JavaScript‘s SHA1 function to the PHP’s SHA1 function. 
Figure 19 shows the output of the test run. 
 
Figure 19: Test run of SHA1 test case 
5.5 Conclusion 
 Text CAPTCHA is good from a security point of view, but it is not very user-
friendly. Hash CAPTCHA can be used to replace the text CAPTCHA as it is very easy to 
implement and user-friendly. In Yioop, the admin has an option to toggle between text 
CAPTCHA and hash CAPTCHA.  
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 CHAPTER 6  
ZERO KNOWLEDGE 
AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM 
 
Authentication is a process of verifying a user’s identity and it plays an important 
role in a security of web applications. There are many ways by which users can provide 
their identity, such as by providing a username and password, using a biometric card, or 
swiping the card.  
6.1 Traditional Authentication System 
 In the typical web authentication system, the user provides their username 
and password and the system displays a results page according to the user’s privileges. 
Figure 20 illustrates the workflow of the traditional login system. In the past few years, a 
number of attacks have been made to sniff usernames and passwords. The eavesdropper 
attack is the most common attack in which the attacker intercepts the authentication data 
transfer over the network and if the data is not encrypted then the attacker can easily 
retrieve the username and password. In the man in the middle attack, the attacker stands 
between the prover and the verifier and acts as the prover to the verifier and the verifier 
to the prover. In the replay attack, the attacker records the successful authentication data 
and can use it later on for the authentication. The easiest thing an attacker can do is try a 
few common passwords such as “12345”, “password”, or “admin” to login to the specific 
account. 
It is unsafe to send a plain text password or hash of a password over the network. 
Sometimes the attacker gets access to a password file stored on a server and if the server 
has stored passwords in the simple text file then the attacker can easily get all the 
credentials within. 
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Figure 20: Workflow of the traditional login system [20] 
Figure 21 shows a summary of the various authentication systems and possible attacks 
on the authentication systems 
Figure 21: Possible attacks on various authentication systems [21] 
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 The above problems are motivational factors to implement the zero knowledge 
authentication system. The zero knowledge system allows user to prove that they know 
the secret (i.e. password) without revealing the actual secret. In this system, a user does 
not need to share the actual password over a network. The server also does not store the 
password or the hash of the password, instead it stores the numerical password derived 
from the user’s actual password. The idea of the zero knowledge authentication system is 
based on an authentication scheme developed by Fiege, Fiat and Shamir, usually known 
as simply Fiat-Shamir. 
6.2 Fiat-Shamir Protocol 
Let's say Alice wants to convince Bob that she knows the password without 
revealing the actual password to him. It sounds impossible, but there is a probabilistic 
process by which Bob can verify that Alice knows the password to an arbitrarily high 
probability [22]. 
Fiat-Shamir has developed a protocol for the authentication that relies on the fact 
that finding a square root modulo N is comparable to the difficulty of factoring. The 
complete protocol is as described below [22]. 
One time setup: 
1. In this protocol, the trusted center selects modulus 𝑁 = 𝑝. 𝑞 where p and q are 
secret large prime numbers and N is public. 
2. Alice knows secret S such that S is co-prime to N and 1 ≤ 𝑆 ≤ 𝑁 − 1. She 
computes = 𝑆2 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁 .  Here, S is private and V is public. 
Protocol: 
1. Alice selects random number r and sends 𝑥 =  𝑟2 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁  to Bob. This step is 
called a commitment phase.  
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 2. Bob sends either 0 or 1 to Alice. This step is called a challenge phase. 
3. Alice sends 𝑦 = 𝑟. 𝑆𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁  to Bob. This step is called a response phase. 
Verification: 
1. Bob verifies 𝑦2 = 𝑥.𝑉𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁.  Here 𝑉 =  𝑆2 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁 and 𝑥 =  𝑟2 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁 
 
Figure 22: Fiat-Shamir protocol 
  In this protocol, a random value is used by Alice during a commitment phase and 
by Bob during a challenge phase. Let’s say Bob does not use a random value for e in the 
second message and uses a fixed value e of either 0 or 1. In the case of 𝑒 = 0, Trudy 
(attacker) sends 𝑥 =  𝑟2 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁  in the first message and 𝑦 = 𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁 in the third 
message. In this case, Trudy isn’t required to know the secret so she can generate any 
random number and convince Bob that she knows the secret. In the case of 𝑒 = 1, Trudy 
will send 𝑥 =  𝑟2.𝑉−1 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁  in the first message and 𝑦 = 𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁 in the third 
message. Bob tries to calculate 𝑦2 = 𝑥 .𝑉𝑒  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁 so the left part of an equation would 
be 𝑟2 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁 and right part would be 𝑥.𝑉𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁 =  𝑟2.𝑉−1.𝑉 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁 =  𝑟2 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁 
thus Bob is convinced that Trudy knows the secret. Thus, it is necessary for Bob to 
choose a random value for e. Trudy can only fool Bob with a probability of ½ and, after 
n iterations, Trudy can fool Bob by the probability: (1/2)𝑛 [21]. 
Alice also needs to choose the random value r for each iteration. Suppose Alice 
chooses a constant value for all iterations. In the case of 𝑒 = 0 and Alice sends 𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁 
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 in the third message. And in the case of 𝑒 = 1, Alice sends 𝑟.𝑆 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁. Here Trudy can 
record all the communication and learn about 𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁 and 𝑟. 𝑆 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁. It is very easy 
for Trudy to derive S from 𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁 and 𝑟. 𝑆 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁 [21]. 
Figure 23 shows an example of Fiat-Shamir protocol. For this example, I have 
assumed the password 𝑆 = 5 and random value 𝑟 = 3. I have also assumed that Bob 
sends 𝑒 = 1 in the third message, so without knowing r and S, Bob can actually 
authenticate Alice using V, y and N.  
6.3 Zero Knowledge Authentication in Yioop 
Yioop has functionality for creating user accounts. Once the account is created 
for the user, it can login to the system using login credentials. We have decided to 
implement zero knowledge authentications for the login module and also want to provide 
an option of toggling between normal authentication and ZKP authentication. The admin 
user has an option to select the authentication mode. Figure 24 displays authentication 
mode options in an admin panel of Yioop. 
On the server side, the first step was to implement database-related code. In the 
existing system Yioop uses a USERS table to store the login credentials. In Yioop, 
“profile_model.php” has all the create table queries so we have added one more create 
table query to it to create the USERS_ZKP table in database. Whenever a Yioop is set up 
for the first time, it accesses “createdb.php” to create database tables and create a default 
root user. We added a query in “createdb.php” to insert the root user in the USERS_ZKP 
table.  
Once the database is set up, the next step was to implement the code in the controller and 
models to support this feature. In Yioop admin controller contains the entry point 
function “processRequest” for the sign in module. I have rewritten this function to 
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  support both authentication modes. This function calls “checkValidSignin” function of 
the signIn model to validate the user credential 
 
Figure 23: Example of Fiat-Shamir protocol 
 We have added a function “checkValidSigninForZKP” to validate the user in 
case of the ZKP authentication. The user model also has a few functions which access 
and alter the various information of the USERS table. In this implementation, all the 
model class needs to identify is on which table it needs to perform the requested 
operation. I have written a function “getUserTableName” which reads the user profile 
file and determines the authentication mode. If the authentication mode is “Normal 
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 Authentication” then it sets the user table name as USERS and if the mode is “ZKP 
Authentication” it sets the table name as USERS_ZKP. Instead of copying this function 
to the every model class I have kept it in the model class file as every class in the models 
directory extends it. 
 
 
Figure 24: Authentication mode option in Yioop 
One of the limitations of the zero knowledge system is that it can only work with 
numbers as it is based on mathematical expressions, therefore we need to find some 
technique to convert the user’s password to numbers. We have implemented SHA1 
JavaScript that has a function to calculate a 40 bit hexadecimal value from the input 
string, so we have decided to use the SHA1 function to convert the user’s password to a 
numeric value. 
The biggest challenge in the implementation was to perform the mathematical 
operations like multiplication, power and modulo on very large number at the client’s 
side. The zero knowledge authentication system was difficult to break only when we 
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 used very large prime numbers (e.g. 160 bits or more). We have thus used jsbn library 
which is a fast and portable implementation of large-number mathematical operations in 
pure JavaScript. 
The user can create the account using the “create account” module. In the case of 
the ZKP system the registration module will be as shown in Figure 25. When the user 
clicks on the submit button after filling in all the details of the create account page, the 
JavaScript “zkp.js” attached to the page calculates Fiat-Shamir parameter V and submits 
the username and parameter V along with other form details. The server then stores the 
username and parameter V in the USERS_ZKP table.   
 
Figure 25: Registration module in Yioop 
 The Fiat-Shamir protocol is an example of an interactive proof system. In order 
to authenticate the user with a very low probability of error, there should be at least 20 
iterations between the server and client. So if we use this protocol for the sign in module 
then the user needs to provide the password 20 times.  
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Figure 26: Login module in Yioop 
This restriction makes this feature counterintuitive. To overcome this restriction, we have 
implemented a JavaScript function which will make an AJAX call to the server and 
sends  Fiat-Shamir parameters. The server validates the parameters and sends random 
No 
Server retrieves V from the database and validates compares y2 = x 
* Ve mod N.
Yes
Yes 
NoValidation 
Pass? 
20th 
Iteration? 
User authenticated 
Client request for the login page 
Server sends the login page and e 
First iteration? 
Client enters the username and password and click on submit. 
ZKP java script calculates Fiat-Shamir paramters and make AJAX 
call to sends parameters  to  the server 
No 
Increments iteration 
count and sends e 
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 value in response. The script will calculate new parameters and sends it to the server. 
This process continues for the given number of iterations. For the last iteration, the script 
sends form data to the server and server sends the appropriate view page.  Thus the 
user’s password is never shared over the network. The flow diagram of the login module 
is as shown in Figure 26. 
6.4 Conclusion 
The zero knowledge authentication system is a unique way to authenticate the 
user. There are few advantages of this system. First, it does not send a password over the 
network so even if an attacker breaks into the network; he will not be able to obtain any 
useful details. Second, it does not require any additional hardware such as a token 
generator or biometric scanning devices to verify the user. Third, there is no change in 
the system from the user’s point of view.  
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 CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
In this project, I have got a chance to learn about various security protocols. The 
first protocol I studied was the Diffie-Hellman key generation protocol. The cipher-suite 
which uses this protocol provides Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS). PFS prevents 
retrospective decryption of previously intercepted traffic. We have also written a PFS 
check script, which can be used to check whether a website supports PFS or not. Yioop 
supports PFS; thus, it provides long-term security to the user data. 
Tor network provides anonymous Internet surfing to users. It also allows 
publishers to publish the service without revealing their identity (IP address). We have 
incorporated code so Yioop can crawl the Tor hidden services and display them in the 
search result.  
We have used hashcash algorithm to design the hash CAPTCHA. Hash 
CAPTCHA prevents spam submissions, thus improves the quality of the website. It can 
be used to replace text CAPTCHA, which is not very user-friendly. We have 
implemented hash CAPTCHA in Yioop and also provided an option to toggle between 
existing text CAPTCHA and hash CAPTCHA. 
 The zero knowledge authentication system is based on Fiat-Shamir protocol. 
Users can log in to the account without sharing their actual password. This system 
provides security to the user’s password as it is not sent over the network and also not 
stored on the server. On the login page, the user needs to give the password and 
JavaScript attached to the page will generate Fiat-Shamir parameters from the user’s 
password. We have incorporated zero knowledge authentication in Yioop’s login 
module.  
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